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The adoption of large-scale computers by the British retail banks in the 1960s required a 
first-time dislocation of customer accounting from its confines in the branches, where it had 
been dealt with by paper-based and mechanized information systems, to a new collective 
space: the bank computer center. While historians have rightly stressed the continuities 
between centralized office work, punched-card tabulation and computerization, the shift from 
decentralized to centralized information work by means of a computer has received little 
attention. In this article, I examine the case of Ferranti and Martins Bank and employ 
elements of Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory to highlight the difficulties of transposing 
old information practices directly onto new computerized information work. 
 
 
In the 1950s the computer, previously the preserve of science and the military, was re-
imagined as a business information machine.i Two British companies were at the forefront of 
that reimagining. One was teashop chain Lyons, which in 1951 developed its LEO (Lyons 
Electronic Office) computer in conjunction with the EDSAC (Electronic Delay Storage 
Automatic Calculator) team at Cambridge University to automate part of its business 
operations.ii The other was electrical engineering firm Ferranti, which made the first 
commercial delivery of a computer to Manchester University earlier the same year.iii Of the 
two companies, it was Ferranti, a conventional technology producer, that was in the best 
position to manufacture and sell business computers in volumes. However, a business market 
ready to receive them did not yet exist. Ferranti and a number of business communities 
   
needed to work out who the organizational users of this machine might be and how those 
potential users could incorporate the new technology into their business practices.iv  
 The British retail banks were strong early candidates. Banking work was inherently 
computational and the end of post-World War II austerity and emergence of a growing 
consumer culture meant that the banks’ existing systems, based around small-scale electro-
mechanical devices, were struggling to keep pace with increased demand. In London and 
other major British cities, escalating volumes of work put pressure on existing branch space 
and staff. A shrinking labor pool and rising operating costs exacerbated the banks’ 
difficulties, and they looked to the commercial arrival of a large-scale electronic computing 
technology for a solution.v The implementation of a new branch accounting system, with a 
computer at its center, was the only way banks believed they would be able to continue 
providing services at a cost their customers were willing to pay.vi  
The major U.S. clearing banks and those in continental Europe had centralized branch 
bookkeeping upon punched card tabulating technology between the world wars.vii However, 
the branch accounting work of Britain’s eleven clearing banks remained a highly 
decentralized affair: 11,000 branches, each operating largely as a self-contained production 
unit, provided current accounts with check facilities for the whole of England and Wales.viii 
The biggest of these branches could be responsible for up to 5,000 customer accounts, but 
didn’t generate enough work to warrant a dedicated large-scale computer of its own, even if 
the space needed in the branch could have been found.ix Therefore the computerization of 
British banking presented a particular challenge; its spatial distribution was at odds with the 
centralization computing required. To accommodate the new technology and make efficient 
use of the computing capabilities, it was necessary to construct a new information processing 
space: the bank computer center. For the first time in Britain, a large-scale dislocation of 
customer accounting from individual bank branches to new computer centers for collective 
processing was required. 
The application of computing to banking is of particular interest to those interested in 
the history of information. Suggesting avenues for future research in the field, information 
historian William Aspray recently highlighted both computing and the financial services 
industry as real-world information businesses worthy of serious historical attention.x JoAnne 
Yates is one of a handful of scholars working in this area who has given serious consideration 
to the history of information technologies in information-intensive industries such as 
financial services. Her early work on vertical filing systems drew attention to staple, but often 
overlooked, infrastructural technologies of the office: loose-leaf paper and filing cabinets.xi In 
   
her 2005 book, Structuring the Information Age, Yates considered the relationship between 
the life insurance industry and information processing technology. In the early twentieth 
century—in the United States at least—life insurance was an industry dominated by a few 
large firms carrying out information-intensive operations from central locations. Drawing 
inspiration from sociologist Anthony Giddens’s structuration theory, Yates showed how the 
structure of this information work made demands on the technologies produced by the 
tabulating industry, and how practices that built up around tabulating machines subsequently 
influenced practices of computing use.xii Rather than the technology determining the work, 
Yates made a strong case for the work shaping the technology. In a more deterministic vein, 
the second volume of James Cortada’s Chandlerian The Digital Hand trilogy devotes four 
chapters to exploring how computers changed the work of the U.S. financial industry. 
Cortada links the introduction of computers to pre-existing processes and procedures built up 
around systems that integrated tabulators with specialist small-scale electromechanical 
devices such as adding machines. His survey of early computer use in U.S. banking 
concludes that early computerization resulted in the automation of well-established 
procedures for well-established purposes, albeit in a different (i.e., a digital) style.xiii Martin 
Campbell-Kelly and William Aspray also stress the continuities between tabulating and 
computing in Computer: A History of the Information Machine.xiv They connect the computer 
to a long lineage of information processing machines and place its business use within 
organizational structures and divisions of labor that were first designed to cope with 
increasing amounts of information during the Industrial Revolution of the early nineteenth 
century. Jon Agar’s central thesis in The Government Machine, his careful study of the 
administrative work of the British state, is that work organized in a machine-like manner 
lends itself most readily to mechanization and computerization. Connecting the discursive 
with the material, Agar explored the power of the “machine” metaphor to argue that it was 
not only the computational nature of much clerical information processing work that made it 
suitable for mechanization and computerization, but also that its ordered organization was 
governed by “rules” that could be readily translated into machine instructions.xv  
The spatial setting for these studies of computerization is the large office. Bernardo 
Bátiz-Lazo and Peter Wardley offer a small-office point of view in their examination of the 
growth of the British bank branch networks and comparison of the banks’ early computer 
purchasing behavior with that of the British building societies.xvi Contextualizing 
technological innovation in retail banking is the foundation of Bátiz-Lazo’s work. Together 
with J. Carles Maixe-Altes and Paul Thomes, Bátiz-Lazo has brought together an impressive 
   
collection of international perspectives that compare computer adoption in Europe, the 
United States, and Mexico by a variety of retail finance’s different organizational forms.
xviii
xvii 
Alan Booth’s monograph, The Management of Technical Change, also offers a comparative 
analysis of automation developments in the United States and Britain from 1950. It contains 
two chapters that provide a succinct critical analysis of post-war British technological change 
and the relations between computing and clerical work. The first deals with British office 
automation in general; the second concerns the computerization of British banking.  
Booth’s case study of computerization in the Midland Bank lies closest to the ground I will 
cover in this article. He analyzes the shift from decentralized branch-centered operation to 
centralized computer-centered operation, suggests that this was done without disruption to 
existing working practices.xix 
I adopt a similar labor perspective to Booth here and follow the transfer of 
information work from the branches of one British bank to its first computer center. 
However, I concentrate my analysis on the creation of new working practices at the center 
and the roles of computing and business cultures in shaping these practices. Following the 
lead provided by Yates, I employ elements of Giddens’s structuration theory to expose bank 
structures and traditions formed out of repeated patterns of action rather than existing as 
monolithic entities, showing the ways in which new working practices formed around the 
introduction of a computer were shaped by these existing patterns. My analysis draws 
attention to the inflexibility of well-established structures to technological change and 
highlights a number of tensions with spatial, occupational, temporal, and material dimensions 
that arose as information work at the computer center was performed according to the 
ingrained rules of the branch. 
This article principally draws upon research undertaken in the archives of the 
Barclays Group, which holds the Martins archives; work in the UK National Archive for the 
History of Computing; and interviews with former workers at Martins Bank. I begin by 
sketching out the beginnings of the relationship between Martins Bank and Britain’s 
commercial computing pioneer, Ferranti, and their creation of Martins’ first computer center. 
A review of Giddens’s structuration theory sets up my analysis of the tensions that 
characterized the Ferranti-Martins relationship, followed by conclusions that consider the 
wider implications of this case. 
 
 
 
   
Constructing the Computer as a Business Information Machine 
 In 1952, in order to stimulate demand for the computer as a business information 
machine, Ferranti’s newly appointed sales manager, Bernard Swann, drew up plans for a 
London Computing Center (LCC).xx Here he envisaged Ferranti could welcome prospective 
customers, address their computerization concerns, and persuade them of the benefits of 
applying a computer to their businesses. The following year, in an attempt to court the 
attentions of the banking community, Swann “encouraged” the editor of The Banker to 
commission a series of articles by Mary Goldring, science journalist for The Economist, in 
which she contemplated the practical possibilities of applying electronic computing to 
banking.xxi  
In the first of three articles, Goldring emphasized that the boundaries of existing 
information processing technologies had been reached. The use of branch accounting 
machines (electro-mechanical combinations of typewriters and adding machines) sped up the 
posting of transactions to customer accounts, but the machines’ capabilities were limited. In 
particular, their maximum speed of operation was restricted by the speed of the fingers of the 
human operator. Goldring suggested that the introduction of the computer would remove this 
dependency and offer the potential for significant increases in information processing 
throughput.
xxiii
xxii However, banks had other factors to consider. Existing mechanized 
accounting processes met the legal requirements to keep a permanent, legible record of every 
bookkeeping transaction in hard copy capable of being read by human eyes; this system was 
itself a replacement for the traditional bound and hand-written ledger book.  Electronic 
computing had not yet been able to provide large volumes of output “in a form that [could] be 
easily understood and that the courts [were] prepared to accept,” but, Goldring argued, recent 
developments offered new possibilities.xxiv The Ferranti Mark I machine upon which 
Goldring based her argument used a magnetic drum store, paper tape input, and output to 
either paper tape or teleprinter. Magnetized metal tape was also a near-future possibility.xxv 
Goldring considered that paper and metal tape could perhaps meet one of the legal 
requirements required of branch accounting in that they provided “a permanent record that 
[could] be interpreted by a trained operator or, for that matter, by a teleprinting machine”.xxvi  
Other factors to be considered included cost and space. Drawing upon Ferranti’s 
rough estimates, Goldring contended that the Ferranti machine would need to replace the 
work of 100 clerks before it could be seen as financially viable. The Ferranti Mark I used 
thousands of valves and was far too big to fit in any British bank branch. Miniaturization was 
a future goal, and the U.S. Bank of America was keen to make use of transistors rather than 
   
valves so that machines could be small enough to fit within the confines of the branch space 
(far bigger in the United States than in British branches).xxvii
xxviii
 Smaller-scale British computing 
developments, such as a 500-valve machine from Elliot Automation, were in existence, but 
Goldring classed them as experimental.   
Goldring premised her articles on British banks’ insistence that major changes to 
banking practices were out of the question but, in a letter to the editor of Financial Times, 
Ferranti’s sales manager stressed the need for banks to overhaul. Swann argued that if the 
banks were to realize significant savings in clerical costs through computerization, they 
would have to re-examine and change their “most treasured [book-keeping] traditions”.xxix 
The banks, however, continued to regard the preservation of their long-established practices 
and procedures as a prime concern.  
Meanwhile, the banks followed the progress made by Lyons Tea Shops as a number 
of articles in the popular press raised the profile of the computer and its commercial 
applications in the minds of the British public.xxx Lyons, a distributed organization, had 
begun to use its computer to automate the ordering and accounting for its nationwide network 
of teashops, but its information work was centralized long before the development of the 
LEO computer. Three hundred clerks at Cadby Hall, Lyons’s head office in West London, 
processed the accounts for 250 teashops. Communication between teashop and head office 
occurred via telephone, and parallel records were maintained at central and distributed 
locations.xxxi Computerizing an already centralized office operation was quite a different 
prospect from computerizing and centralizing a decentralized activity such as the branch 
accounting of a bank. For this reason, although Lyons had early firsthand experience of 
applying computers to clerical work, it shied away from the banks as an early market for its 
computers. In 1955, a Lyons’ report on the applicability of a computer to automating the 
branch bookkeeping work of the Commercial Bank of Scotland concluded: 
 
The installation of automatic equipment at Head Office to perform the clerical work 
which is at present being done in branches cannot be recommended. There is no doubt a 
LEO could carry out the work, but without superior and expensive means of 
communication between Head Office and the branches it would not be possible to provide 
the service which is at present available to customers.xxxii 
 
   
 The technical challenges of enabling communication between branch and center were 
only one side of the computerization coin. The centralization of branch accounting brought 
with it organizational challenges for which there was no clear answer. Accordingly, the 
British banks looked to the United States, where Bank of America had invested heavily in 
research and development to design a custom computerized solution for its branch accounting 
problem. The result was ERMA (Electronic Recording Machine–Accounting).xxxiii
xxxiv
 The 
British banks wanted British manufacturers such as Ferranti to come up with a similar system 
to meet their needs. But whereas Bank of America had provided the Stanford Research 
Institute (SRI) with an estimated $10 million to research and develop ERMA, and General 
Electric (GE) invested $48 million to produce it, the British banks expected producers to 
develop a solution without their financial backing. The banks reasoned that manufacturers 
would soon come to realize the profits of the new system as soon as computer sales took 
off.  In response, Ferranti’s marketing manager suggested that banks would not get very 
far unless they were prepared to spend money.xxxv  
 The National Research and Development Corporation (NRDC), a self-financing 
governmental agency set up in 1948 to manage patents and commercialize the fruits of 
British invention, did inject a limited amount of cash into the nascent British computer 
industry, which was to be paid back when sales were made. Ferranti’s share of just less than 
£1 million of the NRDC money was used in part to fund the development of a computer 
using the modular technology developed by Elliot Automation. This smaller-scale Ferranti 
computer was initially called the Ferranti Packaged Computer No. 1, later renamed the 
Ferranti Pegasus.xxxvi
xxxvii
xxxviii
xxxix
 Ferranti installed a Pegasus computer in its LCC with the aim of 
bringing “potential customers into the center, both to experiment on the Pegasus and to solve 
their own problems.” Within a year the LCC had hosted visits by eighty groups, including the 
British banks.  Ferranti remained eager to work with the banks despite their financial 
restraint; via the NRDC, the company pressed bankers to present themselves as a collective 
rather than approaching the firm with individual requirements.  The banks constituted a 
lucrative market, and it made economic sense that Ferranti produce one general purpose 
computing solution for the banking sector rather than several solutions tailored to a number 
of specific needs. In 1955, the banks created the Committee of London Clearing Bankers’ 
(CLCB) Electronics Sub-Committee.  
Joining representatives from Barclays and Lloyds Bank on this committee’s three-
man working party was Ronald Hindle, manager of Organisation Research and Development 
at Martins Bank. While Barclays and Lloyds were part of the “Big Five” British banks, 
   
Martins was at the head of a pack the press dubbed the “Little Six.”xl More than any other 
bank, Martins was a bank steeped in tradition. It had held a seat in the Bankers Clearing 
House since 1773, the year of its foundation, and traced its beginnings back to 1563 and 
Lombard Street, London where Elizabethan financier, philanthropist, and “father of English 
banking” Thomas Gresham had worked under the sign of the grasshopper.xli Many of 
Martins’ smaller branches continued to use the traditional bookkeeping method of the bound 
ledger and ink pen as late as the 1960s.xlii However, in the second half of the 1950s, led by 
Hindle, the bank developed a thirst for innovation. 
 
Tabulation, Computerization, and Trails 
 As a member of the CLCB Electronics Sub-Committee, Martins Bank was well 
positioned alongside Barclays and Lloyds to take advantage of new business computing 
developments. However, Martins differed from the others in one important way. Not only 
was it considerably smaller than Barclays and Lloyds, and more deeply steeped in tradition, it 
crucially chose not to experiment with punched card tabulation on its route to 
computerization.  
Punched cards and tabulating machines had long been used to automate the work of 
clerical occupations; they were well established worldwide, and had been used successfully 
by a number of British business sectors.xliii Although the British banks deployed tabulators in 
large head office sections to automate international and registrar work, the machines had not 
been used for information processing in branches.xlivIt was only at the end of the 1950s and 
on the advice of IBM that the first British bank, the Bank of Scotland, began to use a 
tabulator to centralize branch bookkeeping at its Edinburgh head office as an intermediate 
step to computerization. This was recognized by Scottish Bankers Magazine: 
 
[The move made] it possible to approach full computer operation by stages, and to 
discover  and dispose of all the major difficulties of centralised accounting and ‘book-less 
book-keeping’ through operations on a smaller scale.xlv 
 
 In England there was one punched card exception. Lloyds’s Pall Mall branch in the 
West End of London was the biggest branch bank in Britain, which due to its historical 
connections with the armed services managed over 60,000 accounts, and had made use of 
punched card equipment since before the Second World War.xlvi Barclays, although not 
   
operational with tabulators for branch bookkeeping, in 1954 began to use them as a 
“simulation of a computer” in order to iron out procedural and political difficulties associated 
with the transfer of branch accounting outside the branch space.xlvii The bank spent five years 
solving the problem of branch–center communication with an experimental punched card 
system in its head office before transferring accounts to a computer in 1961. 
Martins decided instead to make the leap directly from accounting machines and 
manual clerical procedures in the branches to centralized information processing at a 
computer center.xlviii In March 1958, after a number of fact-finding missions to the United 
States and continental Europe and several meetings at home with interested British suppliers, 
Martins issued its “First Assessment of Computer Specification for Martins Bank 
Limited.”xlix Several interested manufacturers responded, as the number of companies that 
desired a share of the burgeoning computer market had grown considerably by 1958. These 
could be split into three groups: existing electronics manufacturers, such as EMI and Ferranti; 
established office automation companies, such as IBM and BTM (the British Tabulating 
Machine company); and new computer manufacturers, such as consumer-turned-producer 
Lyons. To facilitate its decision as to which company offered the best solution, Martins 
carried out a series of feasibility studies using sample branch accounting information. The 
bank determined that Ferranti’s proposal advocating the use of its Pegasus computer 
“appeared to stand out as the one most likely to satisfy the Bank’s needs.”l By 1958 Ferranti 
had completed approximately 30 Pegasus installations, making it the best-selling computer in 
Britain.li 
 A programming team of six bank clerks from Martins and two programmers from 
Ferranti proceeded cautiously from feasibility study to experimentation, learning together 
how computers could be applied to automate the information processes of a branch.lii Trials 
were carried out at Ferranti’s LCC, and a London branch was chosen as a “guinea pig” due to 
its close proximity. Paper tape output from Martins’ South Audley Street branch was 
delivered by hand to the LCC a mile away, where it was fed into a Pegasus computer to be 
processed by an evolving program. It was a steep learning curve for the programmers, but 
after nine months they had a working program that could reliably apply a typical set of 
bookkeeping transactions to customers’ current accounts. 
{INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE} 
 
Figure 1. The Martins-Ferranti programming team, c. 1961. Source: Ronald Hindle, “You and Pegasus”, Martins 
Bank Magazine 16, no. 1 (Spring 1961): 28. Courtesy of Barclays Group Archives. 
   
 
Confident that they had a working solution, Martins and Ferranti made a public 
demonstration in January 1960 for the press, the bank’s directors, senior management, and 
other interested bodies, declaring that this was the first successful “live” processing of current 
accounts of a bank branch by an electronic computer.liii Buoyed by its initial success with the 
Ferranti machine, Martins pressed ahead and ordered a Pegasus II (an improved version of 
the original Pegasus) from Ferranti at a cost of £150,000.liv 
 
A First Bank Computer Center 
 Although the trials with Ferranti were conducted in London, Martins decide to locate 
its computer center at its head office in Liverpool.lv Martins had been headquartered there 
since a 1918 merger with the Bank of Liverpool, and the surrounding area was widely 
considered Martins territory.lvi Liverpool’s city center contained an agglomeration of 
Martins’ biggest and busiest branches, and consolidating the accounts of a cluster of branches 
located within close proximity of a central point was generally considered the easiest route to 
centralization.lvii Furthermore, the head office was an important and well-established 
centerpoint for an organization that conducted its business through the decentralized structure 
of a branch network. It was the meeting place for the bank’s board and a visible concentration 
of power.  
Martins’ head office was a palatial symbol of power built in the 1930s next to 
Liverpool’s town hall.lviii Martins’ first computer center was a converted basement in Derby 
House, a building adjacent to its Liverpool head office that had previously been the home of 
the Liverpool Commercial Reference Library.lix The proximity of the two places prompted 
the press, presumably primed by Martins, to explore the significance of the old alongside the 
new. A report of the computer center’s opening in the Illustrated Liverpool News drew 
readers’ attention to the juxtaposition of computer center modernity with banking tradition. 
The article, “Traditions: A Modern Approach,” was accompanied by two photographs, one 
showing the grandeur of the interior of Martins’ head office and the other the clean, 
modernist lines inside the new computer center. The neo-classical marble interior of the 
banking hall was said to “exemplif[y] in the permanence of its structure the centuries of 
traditions of banking which will endure for centuries to come” through its arches and 
columns, while the bright modernity and fluorescent lights of the computer center illustrated 
a move forward.lx 
   
{INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE, IMAGES SHOULD BE ON 
FACING OR SUBSEQUENT PAGES AS THEY ARE DESCRIBED IN THE SAME 
PARAGRAPH} 
 
Figure 2. The banking hall of Martins Bank Head Office, Water Street, Liverpool, c. 1961. Courtesy of Barclays 
Group Archives.  
 
 
Figure 3. Edna Devaynes in the computer room, Martins Bank Computer Center, Derby House, Liverpool, 1961. 
Courtesy of Barclays Group Archives. 
 
 Martins took delivery of its Pegasus II at the beginning of 1961, earlier than the 
computers ordered by Barclays and Lloyds. A Martins representative commented to The 
Banker that Martins would have the first British bank branch operating bookkeeping on its 
own computer housed in its own computer center.lxi This was not to be. A strike by a Ferranti 
subcontractor resulted in the Pegasus II being delivered three months late, and Martins 
opened its computer center on August 18, 1961, a month after Barclays.lxii Nonetheless, the 
press release that accompanied the opening of the center duly celebrated Martins’ computing 
achievements and gave the impression of solid reliability: 
 
Martins Bank Limited announce that an electronic computer is now in use in their 
premises for the processing of customers’ current accounts. The period of operating the 
computer in parallel with normal Branch work is now over and both Branch and 
customers are now dependent on the computer for their records.lxiii 
 
This was dutifully reported verbatim in the national press. The reality behind the rhetoric was 
quite different, however. A technical fault with the computer at the same time the press 
release was published resulted in computer center accounting grinding to a halt for several 
days.lxiv  
Technical problems were not the only challenges Martins faced. There were also 
significant tensions between the existing information processing structures of the branch and 
the new ones created at the computer center. As JoAnne Yates has shown, Anthony 
   
Giddens’s structuration theory can throw useful light on organizational structures such as 
these, drawing attention to the relationship between action and institution.
lxvii
lxv Yates applied 
structuration theory with a very light touch in Structuring the Information Age, but elsewhere, 
with Wanda Orlikowski, she has used it more strongly to shed light on contemporary 
organizational use of information technologies.lxvi Kevin Borg’s article “The ‘Chauffeur 
Problem’ in the Early Auto Era” is a masterful application of structuration theory as a vehicle 
for the historical analysis of technological change.  Here I use it as a prism with which to 
split the tensions accompanying Ferranti’s and Martins’ new information work into their 
occupational, spatial, temporal, and material parts.  
 
Transposing Occupational Rules 
 For Giddens, agency and structure are mutually self-reproducing. Structures emerge 
from repeated patterns of human action with the capacity to act as enablers as well as 
constraints to further action. Giddens breaks structures down into “rules” and “resources.” 
“Rules” include not just codified and explicit procedures, but also practices and tacit 
assumptions that govern how people get along. “Resources,” meanwhile, can be considered 
either allocative or authoritative. Allocative resources are objects or other material 
phenomena while authoritative resources are people. It is the ability to mobilize allocative 
and authoritative resources that Giddens regards as providing human agents with the power to 
transform existing structures.lxviii 
 Martins’ programmers at the computer center had all previously worked as bank clerks. 
Ferranti, in line with suggestions put forward by other computer manufacturers, saw these 
workers as most suitable for the new role of programmer because they possessed the in-depth 
knowledge of the bank’s procedures required for the necessary pre-programming analysis.lxix 
Experiments at Ferranti’s LCC had highlighted that the existing branch accounting program 
required significant change in order to incorporate a number of identified enhancements. 
When Martins ordered its Pegasus II, the programming team also had to rewrite the program 
to cater for the architectural differences between the Pegasus II and the original Pegasus. In 
addition, the Martins–Ferranti team had to train new staff for what would eventually become 
a Martins-only programming team. Martins’ programmers found the re-write period taxing, 
but, freed from the rigidity of their bank clerk roles, they were excited by the challenge their 
new jobs offered.lxx 
The new position of programmer brought with it other opportunities. Although 
Martins and Ferranti programmers worked side by side, the bank continued to pay its own 
   
programmers a standard bank clerk’s wage. Their assignment to the computer center was 
seen as temporary and they were expected to go back to their previous roles in the branch on 
completion of the automation project.
lxxii
lxxiii
lxxiv
lxxi But Martins’ programmers found themselves in 
possession of a highly marketable set of skills and there came a growing realization that they 
could command a much higher wage working outside of the financial services sector.  
Computer suppliers had an agreement with the banks that they would not “poach” staff, but 
even if this could have been enforced there were still plenty of opportunities elsewhere as the 
market for computing services expanded. Two of the bank’s programmers decided to leave 
during the re-write period, compounding difficulties leading up to the opening of the 
computer center in Liverpool.  The transposition of branch rules regarding pay held strong 
despite the loss of the team’s most skilled and experienced programmers. It would be the 
mid-1960s before programmers and operators were given their own pay scales and the 
requirement for bank computing staff to continue taking their Institute of Banking exams 
gave way to general encouragement that computer center workers should pursue banking 
qualifications. This sentiment would eventually fade altogether.  
Martins also transposed the rules associated with other occupations in the branch onto 
new work at the computer center. With the computer center no more than a mile from the 
branches to be automated, Martins eschewed telecommunications as a solution to branch–
center communication and instead concluded that “[u]nder these circumstances 
communication can be handled quite satisfactorily by means of porters who can physically 
transport data through the streets.”
lxxvi
lxxv Said porters were already responsible for carrying 
confidential paper communications between the head office and the branches, so extending 
their responsibilities to include the safe carriage of paper tape between the branch and 
computer center in the afternoon, and ledgers and statements in the opposite direction in the 
morning, was a logical progression. While Barclays made its center a telecommunication 
showpiece, Martins’ pragmatic solution to the problem of communications made use of 
existing organizational structures and was widely adopted by Lloyds and the other British 
banks.  
Rules associated with the branch accounting machine operators were also carried over 
to the computer center. Martins’ programming team was predominantly male, but all of its 
computer center operators were female. Supervising the small team of operators was Edna 
Devaynes. An experienced branch clerk, Devaynes had been responsible for setting up a 
machine training school at Martins’ head office in the 1950s.lxxvii She trained branch staff on 
how to operate branch accounting machines as Martins moved from the hand posting of 
   
entries in ledgers using pen and pencil to mechanized methods.lxxviii
lxxix
lxxxi
 As the accounting 
machines were introduced into branches, women increasingly became regarded as their 
operators.  They found themselves sitting at the keyboards of the machines because male 
bank clerks did not want to carry out what was regarded as entry-level repetitive work. 
Cultural attitudes were that women had “essential” qualities such as an innate manual 
dexterity and a delicacy of touch that made them better suited to typing, and they had also 
long been regarded as more suited to sedentary employment, possessing more patience than 
their male counterparts to withstand confinement in one place.lxxx However, these qualities 
were more likely acquired than innate. In general, larger branches separated the accounting 
machines from the cashiers’ tills due to the heat, noise, and dust the machines generated. In 
larger branches it was customary to house machines and women together in what was known 
as a “machine room.” This separation of men from women also helped prevent women 
becoming a “distraction” for the men in the branch. Edna Devaynes recalled at Martins that 
women in the branch were forbidden to wear short sleeves lest their brassiere straps became 
visible.  
A detailed gender analysis is beyond the scope of this article, but it is sufficient to say 
that, with the advent of the new computer installation, the feminized machine room 
environment at Martins’ branch was transplanted directly into the computer room at the 
center. lxxxii
lxxxiii
 Women who had previously operated machines in the branch were now retrained 
to operate the computers at the computer center. The computers were simply considered 
large-scale branch accounting machines and Martins’ training school for its machinists 
expanded its scope to become a training school for its computer operators.   
 
Temporal Considerations 
 The transposition of the rules associated with the work of the branch machinists and 
wider expectations of when and where women could be expected to work had a strong 
influence on the nature of information processing at the computer center. Initially, the 
deadline for the Martins computer center to finish each day’s work was 8:00 p.m. Work at the 
center could only begin after the branches closed for business at 3:00 p.m., and so the 8:00 
p.m. processing deadline was increasingly breached as delays caused by machine failures and 
input errors from the branch became more frequent and the total workload increased. It was 
left for the operators’ older supervisor, Edna Devaynes, and programmers at the center to 
operate the computers and finish off any work not completed by the time the “girls” had gone 
   
home. The operators’ working hours were subsequently extended to 10:00 p.m., but never 
any further.lxxxiv  
A major difference between machine-based information work in the branch and 
automatic information processing using a computer at the center was the pace and intensity of 
the work. Work at the computer center required operators to tend to the computer at its own 
pace. In the branch, the accounting machine operators had worked at a pace determined by 
their own manual dexterity. In practice, however, the computer did not dictate the 
metronomic inhuman pace that might first be associated with the computer as an automatic 
machine. The computer and its peripherals displayed a surprising degree of unpredictability, 
which meant that the rhythms of work in the branch machine room were far more regular 
than those in its computer room counterpart. The new information work was characterized by 
a series of irregular peaks and troughs. Days were quiet until entries from the branch began to 
arrive. Work then picked up as evening approached, but frequent stoppages caused by 
hardware failures, and the need for frequent manual intervention even under normal operating 
conditions, meant that those working at the computer center experienced large lulls and then 
often had to work furiously to catch up. This was particularly evident during the first few 
months of the center’s opening when processing in the evening was constantly delayed and 
those that were permitted had to work extremely long hours. Edna Devaynes remembered 
work at the center during this time: 
 
It was all over the show. For the first three months we [Edna and the programming team] 
were like zombies. We had to send people out to bring us food we were that busy and we 
worked right through from 9:00 a.m. in the morning until we’d finished. Some days we’d 
be delivering statements on our way home at 2:00 a.m.lxxxv 
 
The computer was at the center of a reconfiguration of the pace, intensity and duration of 
information work. It would be wrong to assume, however, that in contrast all work in all 
branches was regular and routine, as the poem in Figure 4, published in Martins Bank 
Magazine, illustrates. 
{INSERT FIGURE 4 EXACTLY HERE} 
 
Figure 4. "A Day in the Life of the Branch". Source: Rosemary Andrews, “A Day in the Life of the Branch”, Martins 
Bank Magazine 24, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 58. Courtesy of Barclays Group Archives. 
   
 
A working culture in the branch—where a day’s processing had to be finished before 
everyone could go home—was easily translated into computer center work, but the difference 
between Ferranti and Martins regarding the temporal expectations of computing work proved 
more difficult to resolve. Ferranti engineers reflected on these subjective differences as they 
highlighted some of the difficulties they had experienced with the Martins installation. They 
concluded that “bank jobs” were not like working with a university where time was “not 
important,” and that before they began they had not fully realized the implications of working 
with a business that ran to a daily schedule.lxxxvi 
Ferranti also took issue with elements of branch banking routine that were seen as 
introducing unnecessary processing delays. A major complaint was Martins’ insistence on 
transposing checking procedures from the branch onto the verification of work at the 
computer center. Ferranti’s programmers believed the series of manual checks to ensure that 
the computer had done the bookkeeping correctly unnecessarily slowed the end-to-end 
accounting process. Martins, on the other hand, thought Ferranti was unappreciative of the 
need for checks such as these in banking because the computer firm failed to understand that 
absolute accuracy was required. It was only in retrospect that Martins reflected more deeply 
on this pitfall of its pioneering position and Ferranti’s relative inexperience with business 
computing.lxxxvii  
 
Material Frictions 
 Giddens’s structuration theory can be useful in highlighting the importance of social 
practice and the affirmation of existing institutional structures, but it leaves technology’s 
materiality barely acknowledged. Leonardi and Barley recognize the difficulties of aligning 
materiality with voluntaristic notions of organizational change. They suggest that, rather than 
being restricted to following the social, researchers interested in the co-evolution of the social 
and the material might find it more fruitful to follow the technology instead.lxxxviii 
In Vast Machine, Paul Edwards uses the term “computational friction” to encompass 
the physical, economic, and human limits of computing the weather.lxxxix I deploy the friction 
metaphor more literally here. The computer and its peripherals provided their own material 
resistance that made a considerable contribution to the immaterial tensions of computerized 
centralization. Progress, rather than being enabled by technology, was continually held back 
by machine breakdowns. These affected the computer and ancillary equipment at the center 
as well as the paper tape punch machines at the branch. The “take on” of its first branch was 
   
a painful experience for Martins. It was as late as March 1963—two years after delivery of 
the Pegasus II—that Martins described the whole of its new computer-based information 
processing system as reliable. The consensus at the bank was that an inadequately tested 
machine had initially been supplied.xc  
Continual technical problems with the computer in its first three months of operations 
put a severe strain on the relationship between Martins and Ferranti, but Ferranti’s efforts to 
speed up processing only made matters worse. The company promised Martins a solution to a 
printing bottleneck in the shape of a line printer, which, when connected to the Pegasus II, 
could print out balance lists automatically. Ferranti assured Martins that the line printer 
would be available in January 1962 and the bank directed efforts into a re-write of some 
programming functions to make use of the new capabilities. But the printer did not arrive 
until October and when put into place it, too, was beset with mechanical and electronic 
defects that took a number of months to rectify.xci  
It was not just Ferranti with whom Martins experienced problems. Rather than 
modifying their existing branch accounting machines to produce paper tape as part of existing 
branch processes, as Barclays and Lloyds had done, Martins chose to augment these 
processes with a separate machine, from Swedish firm Addo, that produced paper tape 
output. In response to a Martins request, Addo quickly produced a production-ready version 
of the prototype Addo-X machine that it had initially supplied for the bank’s London trials. 
The machine was prone to a number of mechanical defects that introduced errors into the 
accounting process.
xciii
xcii These defects were compounded by what seemed to be obvious design 
flaws, such as when the machine stopped as the “chad pyramid”—created as a by-product of 
the punch paper tape operation—reached a critical height.  The Addo-X and paper tape 
punch perforator were at least relatively small purchases in comparison to the Pegasus II. 
This allowed Martins to learn quickly from its mistake. After trialing machines from a 
number of different suppliers, it finally settled on an improved machine from another 
company that incorporated checks to ensure its paper tape output matched that which had 
been keyed as input.xciv  
When it came to the Pegasus computer, however, Martins could do nothing but rely on 
Ferranti to rectify machine breakdowns, which were much more frequent than those of the 
computers purchased by the other banks.xcv The Pegasus’s vacuum-tube design was a legacy 
of Ferranti’s pioneering post-war position and the Pegasus II was soon outpaced by smaller, 
quicker, and more reliable transistorized computers from a host of newly emerging 
competitors at home and abroad. A footnote to a table compiled by Williams Deacons Bank 
   
in October 1961 summed up the trailing position of Ferranti’s Pegasus in its survey of the 
bank computing field. The footnote drew attention to the fact that, among those computers 
chosen by the banks, “all the computers apart from the Ferranti Pegasus II are 
transistorized.”
xcvii
xcvi  and Broadbent was appointed head of the newly merged bank’s 
computing division.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 Martins, like the other British retail banks, saw the well-ordered, computational 
nature of banking as suitable to making the task of programming a computer achievable.xcviii 
But alongside the challenge of programming the computer came the challenge of centralizing 
information processing work. Martins chose to meet this challenge head on rather than 
experiment with punched-card tabulators as an interim step. This resulted in an awkward 
discontinuity between mechanized accounting and computer automation, and a necessary 
period of learning took place for Martins alongside the installation of its first computer.  
Although the use of tabulators was not commonplace in British retail banking, other British 
banks such as Barclays, Lloyds, and the Bank of Scotland created their own continuity 
between decentralized and centralized operations by using tabulators as stepping-stones, 
which allowed them to incrementally address the issues surrounding centralization and 
branch–center communication. 
Martins also learned that new practices centered on the computer but modeled on the 
old practices of the branch worked well in some instances (for example, having porters carry 
paper tape), but were less successful in others. Clerks-turned-programmers were able to draw 
on their expert knowledge of the computer in order to seek higher wages elsewhere, as the 
computer became a destabilizing force that upset existing power relations between the bank’s 
management and its workers. Structuring the computer room according to the feminized 
machine room of the branch imposed a time limit on work at the computing center that meant 
the new technology could not be used to its full capacity. In this case, transposing the rules of 
the branch was a stabilizing force that constrained computer center operations.  
While Martins was learning about computing and its application to business, Ferranti 
was learning about banking as an application for its computers. It was a steep learning curve 
for both companies. Because all of this learning took place with “live” accounts, it is 
understandable that relations between the two companies were sorely tested. Both were 
encumbered as well as aided by their pasts: Ferranti’s legacy of military and scientific 
   
computing was not well suited to the business world and Martins branches steeped in 
tradition were not sufficiently prepared for new ways of working through computerization.  
The challenges of computerization and the tensions between the old and the new 
could not have been unique to Martins; all of the clearing banks must have experienced some 
of these difficulties to varying degrees, but a combination of factors exacerbated Martins’ 
difficulties. It was a relatively small bank in terms of deposits and the size of its branch 
network, so the financial impact of the capital investment required for a computer, and the 
disruption of its introduction, were felt more strongly than by those banks in the “Big Five.” 
Martins’ leading position in relation to the rest of the banks also meant that it was unable to 
learn from the experiences of others. The material difficulties thrown up by its first-
generation computer and its peripherals compounded the bank’s problems. 
This article has presented an analysis of first computer use exposing some of the 
difficult realities of the move from mechanized distributed information processing to 
centralized computerized automation. Technology’s materiality, while a contributing factor to 
Martins’ predicament, did not determine the bank’s fate. Rather, it was the social interactions 
of the branch translated into work at the computer center, combined with this materiality, 
which proved to be an overwhelming constraint. The computer was a technology with the 
potential to change existing organizational and occupational structures, and this was not 
something determined solely by the material properties of the computer, but by the social 
interactions that drew on it as an allocative resource. These interactions determined how 
existing rules in the branch would be changed to accommodate the computer, and how new 
rules at the computer center would be created. While the rules of the branch had been created 
out of hundreds of years of practice, those of the computer center were without history. The 
new computer center rules were not, however, born out of nothing; the bank constructed them 
as a result of its computing work with Ferranti and the existing rules of the branch. In the 
process, Martins created a tension between the old and new that took a number of years to 
resolve.  
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